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NOTES

Let's Dump the 1916 Antidumping Act:
Why the 1994 GATT Provides Better
Price Protection for U.S. Industries

ABSTRACT

The U.S. Congress is currently considering a vote to repeal
the 1916 Antidumping Act. The 1916 Antidumping Act makes
the importation of foreign goods that were sold below market
prices illegal if the foreign company had the "intent [to] destroy
or injure an industry in the United States." Few claims have
been adjudicated under the 1916 Act since its passage, and no
plaintiff has won a case based solely on the 1916 Antidumping
Act. Commentators reason that the strict intent requirement or
the availability of remedies in other antitrust statutes has
contributed to this phenomenon. Recently, there has been debate
in the international trade community regarding the Act's
compatibility with multinational trade treaties of which the
United States is a signatory. The World Trade Organization
found the 1916 Act inconsistent with antidumpingprovisions in
1994 GATT, and its Appellate Body upheld those decisions.
This Note discusses the history of the antidumping
legislation and enforcement, the current international
controversy surroundingthe laws of the United States, and the
costs and benefits of using international dispute resolution
procedures to counteract foreign dumping in the United States if
the 1916Act is repealed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 4, 2003, Rep. James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr., chairman
of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary,
introduced in the 108th Congress H.R. 1073,1 a bill to repeal the 1916
Antidumping Act as enacted in Section 801 of the Act of September 8,

1.
To Repeal Section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1916, H.R. 1073, 108th Cong.
(2003) [hereinafter Repeal Act]. A related bill was introduced by Senator Bill Grassley,
chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance. To Repeal Section 801 of the Revenue
Act of 1916, S. 1155, 108th Cong. (2003). In 2001, Representative Bill Thomas,
chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means introduced
H.R. 3557, which also repealed Section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1916, however this
bill was never voted on by Congress. To Repeal the Antidumping Provisions Contained
in the Act of September 8, 1916, H.R. 3557, 107th Cong. (2001).
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1916.2 The 1916 Antidumping Act makes the importation of foreign
goods that were sold below market prices illegal if the foreign
company had the "intent [to] destroy or injure an industry in the
United States. '3 The conduct is a misdemeanor punishable by up to a
one-year imprisonment and no greater than a $5,000 fine. 4 The Act
also creates a private right of action for companies who believe they
were victims of "dumping" by a foreign company and provides treble
damages and "the cost of the suit, including attorney's fee."5
Few claims have been adjudicated under the 1916 Antidumping
Act since its passage over eighty-five years ago. Commentators have
suggested that the reason no plaintiff has ever won on straight 1916
Antidumping Act grounds is either the strict intent requirement read
into the act by the small number of courts which have ruled on the
subject, or that there are antitrust statutes that provide more
6
appropriate relief in these situations.
While adjudication of this Act has been light, 7 there has recently
'been much debate in the international trade community regarding its
compatibility with multinational trade treaties of which the United
States is a signatory. This concern for the Act's power has increased
since a federal court in Utah held that the 1916 Antidumping Act,
which had been used unsuccessfully by U.S. companies to sue foreign
companies on antitrust grounds, could be used to tackle antidumping
complaints.8 The European Community (EC) and Japan filed
separate World Trade Organization (WTO) complaints after
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation settled a suit against Dufreco
Steel alleging it had violated the 1916 Antidumping Act. 9 Both the
EC and Japan argued that the 1916 Antidumping Act is inconsistent
with the antidumping provisions set forth in trade agreements of

2.
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 756, 798-99 (1916) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 72 (2002)) [hereinafter 1916 Antidumping Act].
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
See generally Note, Rethinking the 1916 Antidumping Act, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1555 (1997).
7.
As of 1997, there were only fifteen reported civil actions in the eighty-plus
year history of the Act. Geneva Steel v. Ranger Steel, 980 F. Supp. 1209, 1214 (C.D.
Utah 1997).
8.
Steel Importer Settles with Wheeling-Pittsburgh in 1916 Case, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 26, 1999, at 10. The court denied Ranger Steel's (a German corporation)
motion to dismiss because it found that a violation of the act could occur even when
there were no allegations of predatory pricing or antitrust injury. Geneva Steel, 980 F.
Supp. at 1224.
9.
Steel Importer Settles with Wheeling-Pittsburgh in 1916 Case, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 26, 1999, at 10-11.
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which the United States is a party. 10 They also argued that the
preliminary ruling in the Geneva Steel case allows for U.S. companies
to blackmail foreign competition and force them to negotiate a
settlement for fear of partaking in drawn-out and costly litigation."
The WTO panels found the acts inconsistent with international
13
trade agreements. 12 The WTO Appellate Body upheld the decision.
They recommended that the Dispute Settlement Body request that
the 1916 Antidumping Act be brought into conformity with the
treaties. 14 Legislative action intending to do this resulted over a year
later when Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas introduced H.R.
3557 and then again in 2003 with the introduction of H.R. 1073 and
S. 1155.15
If passed, H.R. 1073 would disallow judgments made pursuant to
the 1916 Act that are inconsistent with the Act's repeal.' 6 Had H.R.
3557 been passed in 2001, it would have ensured U.S. compliance
with the treaties in existence when the WTO agreements were
reached. For a variety of reasons, this bill was not brought to vote
after being referred to the House of Representatives Committee on
the Judiciary.
Though little litigation has occurred since the introduction of
H.R. 3557, one case is of interest for this discussion. Goss Graphic
Systems (Goss), a U.S. manufacturer and supplier of "newspaper
presses, newspaper press additions and other printing press systems
for newspaper, advertising, and commercial printing and publishing
markets," sued MAN Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft
(MAN Roland) alleging violations of the Antidumping Act of 1916.17
Goss claimed that MAN Roland was importing their foreign-made
presses and other equipment into U.S. markets and selling them at
prices far below those in Germany, the company's principal place of
business.' 8 The defendants, MAN Roland, its associates, and their
U.S. subsidiaries, filed a motion to dismiss based on the elements of
the violation as well as on jurisdictional issues. 19 The motion was

10.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
WTIDS136/AB[R, Aug. 28, 2000, at 2.
11.
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra note 9, at 10.
12.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 10,
4-6.

13.

Id.

155-56.

14.
Id. 156.
15.
H.R. 3557, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1073, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1155,
108th Cong. (2003).
16.
H.R. 1073 § 1(a).
17.
Goss Graphic Sys. v. MAN Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 139
F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1042-43 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
18.
Id. at 1042.
19.
Id.
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denied by the district court and discovery has proceeded. A motion for
summary judgment was also denied in 2003.20
This Note discusses the history of antidumping legislation and
enforcement, the current international controversy surrounding the
laws of the United States, and observations concerning the positive
and negative features of using international dispute resolution
procedures to counteract foreign dumping in the United States if the
1916 Act is repealed. Section II of this Note discusses the legislative
history and passage of the 1916 Antidumping Act, including a brief
discussion of later antidumping legislation. Section II also includes a
discussion of the limited judicial interpretation of the Act. Section III
focuses on the WTO dispute regarding the compatibility of the 1916
Antidumping Act with other international agreements regarding
dumping including GATT and the WTO Agreement. Section IV
articulates the positive and negative aspects of repealing the 1916
Antidumping Act and advocates international dispute resolution
through the WTO as the best remedy for dumping.

II. 1916

ANTIDUMPING ACT LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION

Since its passage, the 1916 Antidumping Act has not been the
subject of many lawsuits. 21 In fact, one district court found that until
the 1970s, the 1916 Act was only mentioned in one reported decision,
and even that case did not reach judgment on the merits. 22 There also
been little scholarship on the Act written prior to 1980.23 Cases prior
to the holding by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Co. held only that the 1916
Antidumping Act did essentially the same things as 15 U.S.C. § 15,
which authorizes treble damage actions for violations of antitrust
laws. 24 The court in Zenith, in which a U.S. electronics manufacturer
sued several Japanese electronics manufacturers, undertook an

20.
Goss Int'l Corp. v. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1027,
1044 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
21.
As late as 1974, commentators had noted that no plaintiff had been
successful in proving a violation of the 1916 Act, although four U.S. companies had
filed charges. See Matthew J. Marks, United States Antidumping Laws-A Government
Overview, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 580, 581 (1974).
22.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1212
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
Id. During the court's analysis of the Act, they found only a single reference
23.
in an antitrust treatise to the 1916 Antidumping Act.
24.
Id.
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extensive study of the Act's legislative and social history. It was the
25
first court to do so in the history of the Act.
A. Legislative History of the Act
"Dumping" is defined in the United States as "the sale of
commodities in a foreign market at a price which is lower than the
price or value of comparable commodities in the country of their
origin. '26 The 1916 Act was intended to prohibit international price
27
discrimination that would have injurious effects on U.S. companies.
The Act requires a comparison of the price at which the products are
sold in U.S. markets with the "actual market value or wholesale price
of such articles at the time of exportation to the United States, in the
principal markets of the country of the production." 28 Any product
which is found to be sold at "substantially less than the market
value," after additional expenses such as freight charges and import
duties are included, violates the act. 29 Additionally, to prove violation,
the defendant company must have the "intent of injuring an industry
in the United States.13 0 The interpretation of this latter element has
most concerned courts, especially the Zenith court and the judges in
Geneva Steel v. Ranger Steel. 31 Some commentators believe that the
failure of the Act to define intent has rendered its provisions
32
inoperable.
The 1916 Act has several similarities to both U.S. antitrust
statutes and U.S. customs statutes. 3 3 The most obvious parallel to
antitrust statutes is the treble damage award provided to plaintiffs
who can prove violations of the 1916 Act. 34 In addition, Section 2 of
the Clayton Act prohibits price discrimination between different

25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 1194.
27.
Id. at 1213. Republicans, the key proponents of the legislation, feared that
European manufacturers, whose goods had been stockpiled in Europe during World
War I because of shipping diversions for noncommercial purposes, would flood the
markets at below-competitive prices and destroy domestic manufacturers. Marks,
supra note 21, at 581.
28.
1916 Antidumping Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1212
(E.D. Pa. 1980); Geneva Steel v. Ranger Steel, 980 F. Supp. 1209, 1215-16 (C.D. Utah
1997).
32.
Marks, supra note 21, at 582.
33.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1213-17.
34.
1916 Antidumping Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (2002); Clayton Act, Oct. 15, 1914,
Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27) [hereinafter Clayton Act].
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purchasers of a product in a domestic context. 35 Early courts that
addressed the 1916 Antidumping Act also noted that the standing
provisions of the Act and of Section 2 of the Clayton Act were
similar.36 Similarities to customs statutes can be seen in the 1916
Act's "actual market value or wholesale price" requirement, 3 7 which
has special significance in the Tariff Act of 1913.38 Congress directed
that the customs duties be assessed upon "the actual market value or
wholesale price thereof, at time of exportation to the United States, in
principal markets of the country from whence exported. '3 9 Courts
have found the 1916 Act and the 1913 Tariff Act to be essentially
40
identical in this area.
The political and social environment of the early twentieth
century is essential to understanding the Act. 4 1 The 1916
Antidumping Act was enacted during the end of Woodrow Wilson's
first presidential term. 42 Democrats controlled both houses of
Congress, and they firmly opposed anticompetitive practices. 4 3 With
the majority of Congress believing that judicial construction of the
Sherman Act had stripped it of its ability to deter anticompetitive
conduct, 44 Congress struck back by enacting the Federal Trade
Commission Act in 1914. 4 5 Shortly after that, Congress passed the
Clayton Act. 46 Democrats shared a distaste for high tariff duties and
subsequently passed the Tariff Act of 1913. 47 The Tariff Act had a
small antidumping provision, but it did not create a private right of
action for companies who believed they were victims of foreign
dumping. 48 Though antidumping duties were the only remedy
sanctioned by the Tariff Act of 1913, there was no requirement to
show intent or injury to prove a violation. 49 World War I had the
effect of providing extreme protection to U.S. industries because

35.
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). The Clayton Act is not triggered by
international dumping.
36.
Bywater v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1971 Trade Cas. P73, 759
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America, 1979-81 Trade Cas. P62, 632
(E.D.N.Y 1979).
37.
1916 Antidumping Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72.
38.
38 Stat. 189 (1913) [hereinafter Tariff Act of 1913] (Tariff Act, Oct. 3, 1913,
ch. 16,385 Stat. 114).
39.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1209, 1215
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
40.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1213.
41.

Id.

42.
43.

Id. at 1217.
Id.

44.
45.

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914).

46.
47.
48.
49.

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1914).
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1218.
Id.
Id.
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European products could not be imported, let alone in great quantity
and at below-cost prices. 50 However, the U.S. government was fearful
of the European competition to come with the end of the war.5 1
Although the Executive Branch was concerned about an influx of
foreign products, it was careful to note that any remedy should not
52
restrain normal competition involved in international trade.
Floor debate on the Revenue Act shows that the Democrats in
Congress in 1916 also did not intend to restrict the promotion of free
trade that had been the center of earlier tariff legislation, and were
only interested in supporting an antidumping bill that used tariffs
solely as a revenue-raising scheme. 53 The Democrats enacted the
Clayton Act in 1914, prohibiting price discrimination among domestic
producers, as one of the key contributors to monopoly. 54 However, the
Act did not apply to international commerce, and the Democrats
struggled to find a balance between their interest in subduing
potential monopolies and their zeal for free trade. 55 The Tariff Act of
1913, which included an antidumping provision, was struck down by
the Senate Finance Committee which feared that Republicans might
use the provision to increase tariffs. 56 A proposal by the Secretary of
Commerce Redfield, which recommended that Congress pass
legislation parallel to the Clayton Act for international competition, is
57
now seen as the precursor to the Antidumping Act of 1916.
The 1916 Antidumping Act was not substantially changed from
introduction to passage and enactment. 58 The Act was placed under
Title VIII-Unfair Competition in the Revenue Act-a nod to the

50.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1219.
51.
Id. The court states that it was "anticipated that the European industries,
in a effort to revive themselves, would resort to unfair and predatory methods of
competition." Some commentators have surmised that Americans were most fearful of
the European chemical cartels, who could and wanted to produce and export chemicals
from Europe at predatory prices which were substantially below those that domestic
manufacturers charged. Harvey M Applebaum, The Antidumping Laws-Impact on the
Competitive Process, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 590, 591 (1974).
52.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1219. Secretary of Commerce William
Redfield proposed many legislative remedies in his 1915 Annual Report. He is credited
with proposing the enactment of stricter antidumping laws which was the precursor to
the 1916 Antidumping Act. Id.
53.
Id. at 1222.
54.
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
55.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1217. "Democrats believed that the
protective tariffs then in force insulated domestic trusts from legitimate foreign
competition." Id. at 1218.
56.
Id. at 1219.
57.
Id. at 1220. The Zenith court hypothesized this connection as they were
unable to find any historical evidence pointing to this proposition. Id.
58.
Id. at 1221.
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antitrust issues that the legislature hoped it would curb. 59 This
location suited both members of the executive branch 60 as well as
those of the legislature because they largely shared the belief that
any antidumping provisions were supplemental to the Clayton Act,
6
which did not have an international reach for price discrimination. '
There was little debate surrounding the Antidumping Act, although
tariff provisions of the Revenue Act received much consideration,
according to the legislative history. 62 Floor debates showed that
congressmen believed a major impetus of the bill was to insulate
United States manufacturers from the influx of goods from European
markets after World War I was over.6 3 However, the sponsor of the
Revenue Act stated that the antidumping provision of the act only
required the same pricing restrictions of foreign importers as those
imposed on U.S. companies. 64 In addition, the Wilson Administration
made an effort not to emphasize the tariff provisions of the
Antidumping Act and instead focused on the Act's ability to restrict
unfair competition from foreigners. 65 Most courts, including the one
that decided Zenith Radio Corp., have favored the interpretation of
66
the Act that causes it to be parallel to other antitrust legislation.
However, this analogy is not entirely fitting: the 1916 Antidumping
Act does not require the same level proof of intent as other antitrust
statutes because there is no requirement in the Act that plaintiffs
67
show the foreign corporation had predatory intent.
B. New Antidumping Legislation-The Government Steps In
By 1919, the U.S. Tariff Commission argued that the elements of
the 1916 Act, particularly the intent element, made it almost
impossible to enforce its penal provisions.6 8 The Commission

59.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1221. Secretary of Commerce Redfield
stated that the antidumping provisions was "not intended to retard 'that normal ebb
and flow of legitimate commerce between our land and all others which will provide for
our people the security against exaction which is insured by reasonable competition."
Id. at 1223 n.44.
60.
Id. at 1222.
61.
Id.; see Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13.
62.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1221-22.
63.
Id. Legislators of both parties shared the belief that foreign manufacturers
would turn to any type of action possible to stay in business after the war ended. Id.
64.
Id. at 1222.
65.
Id. at 1223. In a letter to the New York Times, Attorney General Samuel J.
Graham extolled the virtues of the antidumping provision of the Revenue Act, but
made sure to say that its purpose was to prohibit unfair competition, not to raise
revenue. Id. at 1223 n.44.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. at 1201.
68.
Marks, supra note 21, at 582; Applebaum, supra note 51, at 591.
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proposed that administrative remedies would allow the United States
to protect domestic industry better than a criminal or civil statute
whose elements were vague and very difficult to prove. 69 Congress
enacted the Antidumping Act of 192170 in response to growing
financial distress that U.S. companies sustained because of increased
importation from international competitors. 71 This Act was premised
on the assumption that price discrimination between foreign and
domestic markets is per se disruptive of trade and should be punished
72
by tariffs.
The 1921 Act required the government to investigate alleged
cases of dumping and stated that a violation occurred when: (1) goods
were sold at less than their "fair value" 73 in the United States and (2)
a domestic industry was disadvantaged by this practice. 74 According
to the 1921 Act, the Secretary of the Treasury must find that a good
is being sold at less than fair market value, and, in addition, the
International Trade Commission must have found an injury to
domestic industry. 75 To avoid the enforcement issues that plagued the
Antidumping Act of 1916, intent was not an element in the 1921
Act. 76 The Act did not include criminal penalties, and there was no
private right of action granted to domestic competitors injured by the
77
dumping.
The 1921 Act also differs from the 1916 Act in the language used
to define the price differential that must be shown to prove
dumping. 78 Under the 1916 Act, the plaintiff has to show the "actual
market value or wholesale price of such articles," whereas the 1921
Act required the "fair value" of the article to be compared to the
"foreign market value" or the "constructed value.' '7 9 The 1921 statute
defined these terms and "fair value" was defined in the customs

69.
Marks, supra note 21, at 582 (noting the difficulty posed by the 1916 Act of
taking effective action against offenders).
70.
Antidumping Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-10, 42 Stat. 11, 13 (1921) (codified
as amended 19 U.S.C. § 162 (1970)) (repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144) [hereinafter Antidumping Act of 19211.
71.
The Tariff Commission (now the International Trade Commission)
supported a new initiative to tackle foreign dumping and Congress relied heavily on
their findings when drafting the Antidumping Act of 1921. Applebaum, supra note 51,
at 591-92 (citing U.S. TARIFF COMM'N REPORT: DUMPING AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

(1919)).
72.
Marks, supranote 21, at 582.
73.
"Fair value" for purposes of the Antidumping Act of 1921 meant the "home
market price of identical or similar merchandise." Id. at 582-83.
74.
Id. at 583.
75.
Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 162 (1970).
76.
Id.
77.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1224
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
78.
Id. at 1225.
79.
Id.
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regulations."0 The two statutes, although dealing with the same
behavior, were interpreted as complementary and typically those
companies that file 1916 cases also petition the International Trade
Commission for a finding of illegal dumping and an imposition of
tariffs upon the offending imports.8 1
Many allegations of dumping violations were made in the years
immediately following the passage of the 1921 Act, however, after
World War II, the government adopted a more liberal trade policy
and worked to lessen tariffs for imports, reducing the number of
prosecutions under the Act.8 2 The government brought more dumping
cases in the 1970s due to the increase in the foreign imports market,
which began in the 1960s and was left largely unchecked until the
83
next decade.
The Antidumping Act of 1921 was amended several times, most
drastically by the passage of the Trade Act of 1974.84 These
amendments created an open disclosure policy, time limits for
investigations, transcribed hearings, and new administrative
procedure requirements.8 5 The 1921 Act was repealed by the Trade
Agreement Act of 1979,86 however its provisions have been
87
incorporated into other code sections.
C. Early Case Law Interpretingthe Act
The Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 has not been used much in its
long life.8 8 Tariffs as high as forty percent usually kept international

80.
Id.
81.
See Geneva Steel Co. v. Ranger Steel Supply Corp., 980 F. Supp. 1209, 1212
(D. Utah 1997) (explaining that steel producers additionally petitioned the
International Trade Commission for a finding of illegal dumping of steel from three
countries).
82.
Marks, supra note 21, at 583.
83.
Id. at 583-84. At the beginning of his presidency, Richard Nixon adhered to
the liberal trade policies put in place by his Democratic predecessors. By early 1970s,
his policies had changed and his administration attempted to revive the 1921 Act by
creating a new set of regulatory procedures such as manpower increases. This
expansion led to an increase two-fold in the number of cases brought by the Treasury
Department from 1968 to 1973. Id. at 584.
84.
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974).
85.
Marks, supra note 21, at 584-85.
86.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title I § 106(a), 93 Stat.
193.
87.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2002). There were some post-Uruguay Round changes
to the antidumping law that morphed from the Antidumping Act of 1921, however
these changes do not affect the application of the 1916 Act to dumping violations as
they are primarily changes to the petition provisions. See Raj Bhala, Rethinking
Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 24-55 (1995) (summarizing
pre-Uruguay Round law).
88.
See discussion supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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competitors from pricing below domestic manufacturers.8 9 However,
after the Uruguay Round agreements went into effect, the tariffs
plunged dramatically with most industrial countries only charging an
average duty of 3.9 percent on imports. 90 Anti-dumping orders issued
under the provisions of the Antidumping Act of 1921, which were
minimal by any standard prior to 1980, increased two-fold in that
decade and, in conjunction with the rise in orders being issued by the
U.S. Department of Commerce and the International Trade
Commission, there was also a spike in the number of lawsuits
brought in U.S. courts under the Antidumping Act of 1916.91
Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Electric Ind. Co.,
decided by the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sheds light on the purpose and legislative history of
the Act. 92 While the Act was interpreted prior to Zenith in three
reported cases, 93 none of these cases had delved into the legislative
and social history of the act. Both Bywater v. Matsushita Electric Co.
and Schimmer v. Sony Corp. of America were dismissed because the
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 94 Standing is a recurring theme in
1916 Act litigation and courts have not been entirely consistent in
their application of the doctrine. 95 In the other action, Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, the court held that the 1916 Act did not apply
to cases where the product in question was not manufactured for sale
in another country but was only manufactured for importation to the
United States. 96 The courts in these cases dismissed the antidumping
claims without exploring the statute.

Bhala, supra note 87, at 3.
89.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 3-4.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1190
92.
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
93.
Bywater v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1971 Trade Cas. P73, 759;
Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America, 1979-81 Trade Cas. P62, 632; Outboard Marine
Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 384 (D. Del. 1978).
Bywater, 1971 Trade Cas. P73, at 759; Schimmer, 1979-81 Trade Cas. P62,
94.
at 632. Both courts found the provision in the 1916 Act which authorizes treble
damages substantially the same as antitrust treble damage statutory provisions, and
held that standing for the 1916 Act was the same as standing in antitrust suits.
After Zenith was decided, the District Court for the Southern District of
95.
New York held that where there were no domestic producers for a given market,
another international importer could sue for alleged injury under the 1916 Act. See
Isra Fruit, Ltd. v. Agrexco Agric. Export Co., 631 F. Supp. 984, 988-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Outboard Marine v. Pezetl, 461 F. Supp. 384, 408-09 (1978). In this case,
96.
the plaintiff, a domestic manufacturer of electric golf carts sued a Polish manufacturer
under the Sherman Act, the Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916. The court
dismissed the Antidumping Act claim. Id. Another review of a plaintiffs standing to
sue in antidumping cases occurred in Western Concrete Structures Co. v. Mitsui & Co.,
760 F.2d 1013, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 1985). The court held that the 1916 Act only protected
domestic manufacturers of the dumped good, and therefore competitors of the
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The Zenith antidumping litigation is part of a monstrous
antitrust lawsuit filed by U.S. electronics manufacturers against
foreign manufacturers. 97 The conspiracy alleged by the plaintiffs was
massive-purportedly spanning thirty years and involving over one
hundred firms. 98 Zenith Radio Corp. v. MatsushitaElectric Industrial
Co. was the district court opinion which dealt directly with several
defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' 1916 Antidumping Act
claims and is arguably the most comprehensive review of the
legislation to date. 99 The court premised its opinion on a reading of
the legislative, social, and political history of the 1916 Act' 00 as well
as on the Act's relation to the 1921 Antidumping Act, 10 1 antitrust
03
statutes,10 2 and customs statutes.
The Zenith court concluded that the 1916 Act was enacted due to
the efforts of a Democratic-controlled Congress which was "vigorously
opposed to anticompetitive and monopolistic practices."'1 4 Based on
the political and legal history of the time, the court found that the
statute was geared more toward antitrust law than protectionist
customs law. 0 56 The court also held that interpretation of the law
should closely parallel any existing antitrust law applicable to
domestic commerce, particularly Section 2 of the Clayton Act, since
06
both laws deal with price discrimination.1
D. Interpretationof the Elements of the Antidumping Act of 1916
The meaning of elements of the 1916 Act was hotly contested in
the Zenith case, and because the Act had not been adequately
interpreted in its sixty-plus years in existence, the court made several
findings regarding the definitions of words used in the statute.
Language that was statutorily defined to value the merchandise
("such or similar merchandise") for comparison was defined broadly

purchasers of the dumped good, such as the plaintiff, did not have standing to sue
under this Act. Id.
97.
The litigation includes several cases. Only Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp.
at 1190, and In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980)
are discussed in this Note.
98.
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1074.
99.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1195.
100.
Id. at 1217-23.
101.
Id. at 1223-26.
102.
Id. at 1213-15.
103.
Id. at 1215-17.
104.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1217. The Democratic Party platform
in 1912 denounced private monopoly and "demand[ed] the enactment of such
additional legislation as may be necessary to make it impossible for a private monopoly
to exist in the United States." Id.
105.
Id. at 1220.
106.
Id. at 1223.
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for purposes of the 1921 Act, however its definition and subsequent
revisions were not included in the 1916 Act. 10 7 Although Congress
amended the 1921 Act in 1958 to allow the Secretary of the Treasury
broad discretion to compare prices of products if it could not find
exactly the same merchandise being sold in a market outside the
United States, the broadening amendments were not specifically
applied to the 1916 Act and therefore cannot be used to find 1916 Act
10 8
violations.
The Zenith court held that statutory construction of "such
articles" did not lend itself to a strict interpretation of the comparison
language: meaning that even if an identical product was not found, a
comparison could still be made to find what the fair value of the
product should be.' 0 9 Using statutory construction, prior customs
decisions, and dictionary meanings of words to shape their holding, 110
the court found that the precise degree of similarity which the 1916
Act required for comparison could be derived from looking to Section
2 of the Clayton Act and the appraisal provisions of the Tariff Act of
1913.111 Interpretation of Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act, 112 found that "if there are substantial
physical differences affecting consumer use, preference, or
marketability, such products are not of 'like grade and quality'
regardless of manufacturing costs. 11 3 The Tariff Act standard the
court relied on is as follows: "if goods are made of approximately the
same materials, are commercially interchangeable, are adapted to
substantially the same uses, and are so used, ordinarily, they are
similar." 1 14 Despite the interpretation advocated by the foreign
defendants, the court's ruling provided that "such or similar
merchandise" actually did not make it necessary for the foreign

107.
Id. at 1225-26.
108.
Id.
109.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1226.
110.
Id. The court gave five reasons for rejecting the defendants contention that
only identical products could be compared, (1) the customs decisions relied upon by the
defendant did not support this contention, (2) defendants' construction of the phrase
required a departure from the ordinary meaning of "such", (3) the customs decisions
that the defendants rely on for a definition of the word "such" does not support he same
construction in 1916 cases, (4) the defendants' construction of "such" would exempt
non-identical goods from price discrimination laws that would not ordinarily be
exempted in domestic laws and (5) the defendants' construction was contrary to
customs appraisement standards of contemporary law. Id.
Id. at 1226-27.
111.
112.
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936).
113.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1227 (quoting the standard found in
Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 405
F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969)).
Id. (quoting the standard from United States v. Irving Massin & Bros., 16
114.
Ct. Cust. App. 19, 25 (1928)).
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comparative merchandise to be identical to that which was allegedly
being dumped in U.S. markets. 115 "The court interpreted the phrase
'such articles' in the 1916 Act to refer to the articles imported into the
United States. ' 116 It was held that the price of the article could be
compared to similar articles sold in the home country because, by
using the words "actual market value," Congress had incorporated
into the Act a system of customs appraisal which authorized
appraisers to look at the value of goods which were similar but not
117
identical to the good being appraised.
Similar materials had to be of "like grade or quality," and the
court spent a portion of its opinion determining exactly how similar
the comparison article had to be for the purpose of appraising the
good. 118 Trying to stay true to the price discrimination laws to which
it compared the 1916 Act, the court held that an overbroad
determination of what could be considered 'like grade or quality"
would turn the legislation into a protectionist statute. 119 The 1916
Act, like any other price discrimination law, had the tendency in its
enforcement to encourage "price rigidity. '120 Subsequently, any
reference to "like grade and quality" in the 1916 Act had to be
construed in the same way as the phrase was interpreted in any
Robinson-Patman litigation or legislative history. 121 Finally, since
other courts interpreting this phrase in the context of price
discrimination litigation had held that, whether the differences were
slight or substantial, this was not a question that could be answered
1 22
at the summary judgment stage.
Interpretation of "intent to injure" was addressed most
comprehensively in the Geneva Steel Company v. Ranger Steel Supply
Corporation decision. 123 There, the court held that Geneva Steel
would meet the intent to injure element if it could show that Ranger
Steel Supply, a U.S. subsidiary of Thyssen AG (the largest steel
supplier in the world at the time of the dispute), had one of the
following five intentions when importing steel at prices below the

115.
Id. at 1228. The court noted that the defendants had not cited any
legislative history in their brief to lead the court to believe that Congress intended
"such" to mean "identical". In addition, the line of cases the defendants pointed the
court to did not make reference to the foreign goods in their meaning of "such", nor are
the applicable customs cases which term "such" to mean "identical" prior to the passage
of the 1916 Act. See id.
116.
Id. at 1230.
117.
Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1231.
118.
Id. at 1230-31.
119.
Id. at 1231.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 1233.
122.
Id.
123.
Geneva Steel Co. v. Ranger Steel Supply Corp., 980 F. Supp. 1209, 1215 (D.
Utah 1997).
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actual market value of the articles in the country of production: (1)
the intent to destroy a U.S. industry, (2) the intent to injure a U.S.
industry, (3) the intent to prevent the establishment of a U.S.
industry, (4) the intent to restrain trade and commerce in the subject
market, or (5) the intent to monopolize trade and commerce in the
subject market. 124 The court reasoned that all but the last two
intentions were actually protectionist in nature, while intent to
restrain trade and intent to monopolize were more akin to antitrust
125
prohibitions and sought to protect competition generally.
The court's decision provided that Geneva Steel would be entitled
to damages even if they did not prove "predatory intent" or satisfy the
specific requirements of predatory intent, thereby separating the
1916 antidumping laws from antitrust law by rejecting the antitrust
intent standard. 126 Consequently, the 1916 Antidumping Act had a
protectionist reach beyond traditional antitrust and pricediscrimination pleading requirements. 127 The court held that the
plain words of the statute protect the United States against unfair
dumping, "whether the dumper possessed predatory intent or not.' 128
The only intent required by the act is to "injure" a domestic U.S.
industry. 129 The Geneva Steel court disagreed with the Zenith court in
the interpretation that the 1916 Act had any more significance as a
protectionist statute than other antitrust statutes: the Geneva Steel
court believed it was more than "an international extension of
domestic 'unfair competition' laws.' 130 Significantly, although the
Geneva Steel court did not believe it necessary, because they held the
plain language of the statute was clear, they also found that the brief
legislative history of the 1916 act supported the contention that the
131
1916 Act was a protectionist statute.
Wheeling-PittsburghSteel Corporationv. Mitsui & Company, the
most recent case prior to the introduction of H.R. 3557, affirmed the
reasoning set forth in Geneva Steel regarding the plaintiffs burden of
proof of the defendant's intent to injure in 1916 Act cases. 132 The
defendants in Wheeling-Pittsburgh, a group of importers of Japanese
and Russian hot-rolled steel, made a motion to dismiss WheelingPittsburgh's complaint that their sales of hot-rolled steel below prices

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
(S.D. Ohio

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1217.
Geneva Steel Co., 980 F. Supp. at 1217.
Id.
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1221.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604
1999).
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charged in Japan and Russia violated the 1916 Act. 133 The
defendants stated that the Act should be interpreted to require proof
134
that the defendants had "predatory intent" in selling products.
Mitsui & Company advocated defining predatory intent as "intent to
later gain market control and then recoup dumping losses by raising
prices.' 135 Although Geneva Steel had been decided a mere two years
earlier, the defendants in Wheeling-Pittsburgh tried to convince an
Ohio district court that the 1916 Act was only an extension of U.S.
antitrust law and should be construed similarly by courts, meaning
13 6
intent must be predatoryto find a validation.
In addressing this issue, the court reviewed the language of the
137
It
1916 Act in contrast to the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts.
found that the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts prohibited "a
seller of goods from price discrimination as to products of similar
grade and quality. The motive of the seller, by the terms of the
statute, is inconsequential.' 138 As the court found little instruction in
the statutes' text, it turned to Supreme Court interpretation. In
Brooke Group Limited v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,139 the
Supreme Court set forth a unified standard for the plaintiffs burden
of proof under the Sherman, Clayton, or Robinson-Patman Acts for
claims alleging predatory pricing. 14 Among other elements, the
Court held that the plaintiff must show that the defendant expected
its "cut-throat prices would reasonably lead to its market dominance,
to the point that it could later raise prices and recoup its losses
incurred by selling at a predatory price.' 14 1 In Wheeling-Pittsburgh,
the defendants claimed that the plaintiff should be required to show
on the face of the complaint that there was predatory intent and a
142
reasonable prospect of market dominance.
The Wheeling-Pittsburgh court rejected the defendants'
argument for several reasons, affirming the Geneva Steel court's
holding that predatory intent was not intended to be one of the
elements of proof of violation of the 1916 Act. First, it was determined
that there is no constitutional mandate that Congress "impose the
same standards of conduct on the importers of goods as it does on

133.
Id. at 599.
134.
Id.
135.
Id. This definition is similar to the one used in U.S. antitrust laws. See
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 and Clayton Act as amended by Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12, 13.
136.
Wheeling-PittsburghSteel Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
137.
Id. at 601.
138.
Id.
139.
Id. at 602.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Wheeling-PittsburghSteel Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
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domestic producers of goods. ' 14 3 Because there were no specific
provisions regarding predatory pricing in the domestic statutes, the
judicial imposition of a heightened standard for these offenses was
necessary, in the view of the Wheeling-Pittsburgh court, to promote
the primary goal of increasing competition. 144 In addition, the ruling
provided that the additional element required by the 1916 Act, proof
of intent to injure or destroy domestic industry, which was
conspicuously absent from the domestic statutes, negated any need
for "interstitial jurisprudence on behalf of the federal courts.' 1 4 5 The
opinion also provided that "predatory pricing" meant something
different than the pricing contemplated to cause injury in the 1916
Act, and that it was within Congress' privileges to distinguish harm
146
caused by domestic competitors with harm caused by importers.
After a review of the major decisions which have interpreted the
1916 Antidumping Act, the state of the Act's interpretation at the
time of the international dispute between the European
Communities, Japan, and the United States in 1999 required proof of
the following elements: (1) importation of a good at (2) a substantially
lower price than the actual market value or wholesale price of such
articles at the time of exportation in the principal markets of the
country of production or other foreign countries to which the good is
exported when (3) the intent is to destroy or injure a domestic U.S.
industry, prevent its establishment, or restrain or monopolize trade
in the United States. 147 "Such materials" should be interpreted as it
is in domestic antitrust statutes, 148 and "intent" should not be
interpreted to require a showing of "predatory intent," and the
interpretation of the element should allow for Congress to treat
domestic and foreign competitors differently if it so desires. 149 In the
eighty-five years of 1916 Antidumping Act jurisprudence, the U.S.

143.
Id.
144.
Id. at 603. The court believed that domestic antitrust statutes required
additional proof of predatory intent, subsequent market dominance, and price
recoupment because, among domestic competitors, it was necessary to distinguish
between aggressive price-cutting, which was good for both competition and consumers,
and anti-competitive price-cutting which would, in the long run, be bad for competition
and consumers by decreasing the number of competitors. See id.
145.
Id. The court did note in dicta that if Wheeling-Pittsburgh had plead an
intent to restrain or monopolize trade or commerce (the fourth and fifth types of harm
described in the Antidumping Act of 1916) that it would be possible that analysis of
these harms should follow that which was set forth in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). Wheeling-PittsburghSteel Corp., 35 F.
Supp. 2d at 603.
146.
Id. at 604.
147.
Id. at 600.
148.
See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
149.
See supra notes 121-44 and accompanying text.
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federal courts have essentially interpreted the elements of the offense
to create a hybrid of antitrust and protectionist legislation.

III.

THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH-ARTICLE IV OF THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 1994

A. The Agreement
The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947 GATT),
signed by most industrialized nations, included a provision accepting
the validity of members' antidumping provisions even though its
purpose was to prevent "competing protectionist trade policies from
undermining world economic welfare."'150 The original 1947 GATT
Agreement did lead to a general decrease in tariff rates. 15 1 However,
early anti-dumping provisions in Article VI of the 1947 GATT failed
to provide adequate guidance and were therefore largely
ineffective. 15 2 After provisions in the Kennedy Round Code and the
Tokyo Round Code (subsequent GATT revisions) were found to be too
general, the members of the WTO signed the Uruguay Round Code,
used by member
and it is the current antidumping agreement
15 3
countries to protect domestic industry.
The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (1994 GATT) creates
substantive and procedural requirements that must be followed in
order for a country to impose anti-dumping measures on goods from
another country. 154 Substantively, the Agreement requires that a
member country, before imposing anti-dumping measures, must

150.
Dianne M. Keppler, Note: The Geneva Steel Co. Decision Raises Concerns in
Geneva: Why the 1916 Antidumping Act Violates the WTO Antidumping Agreement, 32
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 293, 302 (1999) (citing the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT 1947]).
151.
Previous Agreements, ADP: Dumping in the GATT/WTO, available at
(last visited
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis_e/eol/e/wto04/wto4_4.htm
Mar. 17, 2004).
Id. 'The first such Code, the Agreement on Anti-Dumping Practices,
152.
entered into force in 1967 as a result of the Kennedy Round." Id. The United States
failed to sign this agreement so its effects were not significant. Id.
153.
Id.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-The Uruguay Round: Agreement
154.
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994)
[hereinafter 1994 GATT]; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Dec. 15, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3778 [hereinafter
AD Agreement]; Summary of Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/
English/tratop-e/adp-e/antidum2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
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prove that there are dumped goods, that there has been a material
injury to domestic industry, and that there is a causal link between
the dumped imports and the injury. 155 The Agreement provides
detailed rules regarding the determination of injury and the
definition of industry, the two fundamental elements in determining
a dumping violation. 156 Procedurally, the Agreement creates
requirements that will "ensure transparency of proceedings, a full
opportunity for parties to defend their interests, and adequate
15 7
explanations by investigating authorities of their determinations."'
Specifically, there are special provisions which detail the protocol for
initiating and conducting investigations, imposing provisional
measures, making settlement agreements between countries (called
price undertakings), imposing and collecting duties for dumping
violations, and the duration and review of anti-dumping measures. 158
The Agreement also provides for a WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping
Practices and creates requirements by which members must provide
information regarding any preliminary and final actions taken on
anti-dumping as well as current and new anti-dumping laws
implemented in their countries. 159 Finally, there is a special standard
of review created by the Agreement to be applied by panels in
deciding anti-dumping
disputes that provides guidance in
1 60
determining matters of fact as well as questions of interpretation.

B. The Dispute
Although the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (AD Agreement)
provides in Article 1 that antidumping measures will only be applied
by signatories in a manner consistent with the Agreement, U.S. trade
representatives have indicated in remarks that the 1916
Antidumping Act was "grandfathered" under the Uruguay Round
Agreements. 161 However, after the Wheeling-Pittsburgh decision in
1999 (and quite possibly as a response to it), both the European
Community (EC) and Japan filed claims with the WTO Dispute
Settlement Board (DSB) maintaining that the 1916 Act is

155.
Summary of Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/English/
tratope/adp.e/antidum2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
Keppler, supra note 150, at 303-04 (quoting the statement from then-U.S.
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky before the Subcommittee on Commerce of
the House Committee on Appropriations).
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inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the 1994
GATT, the AD Agreement, and the Marrakesh Agreement
16 2
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement).
Both members complained that the 1916 Act violates the abovementioned international agreements because "under certain
conditions, civil actions and criminal proceedings [are allowed] to be
brought against importers who have sold foreign-produced goods in
the United States at prices which are 'substantially less' than the
prices at which the same products are sold in a relevant foreign
3
market."16
Generally, the international agreements allow governmentimposed remedies in the form of duties or tariffs when it is found,
through a prescribed formulaic approach, that a foreign company has
sold imported goods at sub-competitive prices. 164 However, these
agreements do not permit individual companies who claim they have
been harmed by a foreign competitor to find a remedy in the
member's domestic courts that involves a monetary restitution to that
165
company.
Both the EC and Japan claim that the 1916 Act conflicts with
Articles 111:4, VI:I, and VI:2 of the 1994 GATT, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and
166
5 of the AD Agreement, and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.
Additionally, Japan believes that the 1916 Act also violates Articles 9,
11, 18.1, and 18.4 of the AD Agreement. 167 The 1994 GATT and AD
Agreement articles correlate directly to specific antidumping
obligations among members, however Article XVI:4 of the WTO
Agreement is more general, requiring that "[e]ach Member ...ensure
the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures
68
with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.'
A Dispute Resolution Panel was convened for each member's
claim, however it was agreed that because the claims were of such a
similar nature, the composition of the panels would consist of the
same three persons. 169 The panels returned almost identical findings

162.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
1-3.
supra note 10,
Id. 2.
163.
164.
See 1994 GATT, supra note 154, art. VI, sec. 2; AD Agreement, supra note
154, art. 2.
See id.
165.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
166.
supra note 10, 3.
167.
Id.
168.
See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993,
33 I.L.M. 13 (1994), art. 16.4; 1994 GATT, supra note 154, art. VI; AD Agreement,
supra note 154, art. 2.
169.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 10, 1. The Report of the Appellate Body incorporates the arguments of the
United States, the European Community, and Japan, as well as both panels' initial
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concluding that the 1916 Act did violate certain Articles of the 1994
GATT, the AD Agreement, and the WTO Agreement. 170 The remedy
suggested by the panels was that the Dispute Settlement Body
"request the United States to bring the 1916 Act into conformity with
its obligations under the WTO Agreement.' ' 7 1 In May of 2000, the
United States appealed issues of law covered in both panel reports,
and the Appellate Body was convened to hear oral arguments and
compose a ruling. 172 Interestingly, India and Mexico also each filed a
173
third participant's submission.
The United States challenged the panel's rulings both
procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, the United States
argued that the Panel did not possess jurisdiction over both the 1994
GATT and AD Agreement claims. 174 First, both the EC and Japan
had invoked the jurisdiction of the panels under an article in the AD
Agreement (Article 17.4) which requires the complaining party
challenge either an antidumping duty that had been imposed, a price
undertaking, or a provisional measure put in place by a member. 175
However, neither the EC nor Japan was challenging one of these
measures in its complaint. Therefore, the United States argued that
the panel did not have jurisdiction over either member's claims. 176
Furthermore, the United States argued that the AD Agreement and
1994 GATT were part of an "inseparable package of rights and
obligations" and because the panel did not have jurisdiction over the
EC and Japanese claims under the AD Agreement, it did not have
177
jurisdiction over the 1994 GATT claims.
The EC responded that the U.S. objection to jurisdiction was
both untimely filed and unfounded in law and precedent. 178 The
proper time to file a jurisdictional objection was "before the interim
review stage of the panel proceedings" as interim reviews are only to
review decisions made by the panel, and not to rule on new
arguments. 179 Additionally, the EC argued that Article 17.4 of the AD
Agreement (which speaks directly to specific anti-dumping measure
challenges) does not generally shelter legislation from scrutiny for

findings, therefore a citation is included only for the Appellate Body Report, not each
individual panel report or party filing.
170.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
supra note
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.

Id. (citing the panel reports for both of the preceding cases).
Id. 7.
Id.
Id. 9.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
10, 9.
Id. 10.
Id. 11
Id. 23.
Id.
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continuity with WTO provisions. 80° All legislation must fit within the
boundaries of the WTO agreements. 81'
Japan used a different tactic when arguing its jurisdictional
challenge, claiming that any GATT/WTO member has the general
right to challenge
another member's facially inconsistent
legislation.' 8 2 This position was consistent with that of the EC in that
although Article 17.4 creates special rules to challenge specific
antidumping actions taken by members, any general rights of the
83
members are not. overridden.1
The United States also challenged the panels' rulings on the
1916 Act as mandatory or discretionary legislation, the latter of
which would allow an interpretation of the Act that would permit the
United States be consistent with its WTO obligations.' 8 4 The United
States argued that this distinction was still relevant, despite the fact
that the Japanese panel found that Article 18.4 of the AD Agreement
rendered it "irrelevant.' 8 5 Finally, the United States argued that the
panels had erred in requiring the United States to prove that the
distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation was
applicable in this case.' 8 6 The burden of proof that a member's law
conflicts with a WTO provision, the United States maintained, is with
the complaining party who must subsequently prove that the law
"mandates a violation of the relevant provision.' 8 7 For these
procedural reasons, the United States requested the Appellate Body
vacate the panels' findings and recommendation.
With regard to the mandatory versus discretionary distinction,
the EC contested the existence of such a principle and argued that
even if the Appellate Body disagreed, the distinction of having
discretionary legislation would not shield the U.S. from review in
dispute settlement proceedings.' 88 The Japanese argued that the
language of the 1916 Act was clearly mandatory because it required
an imposition of fines and criminal penalties if the elements of the

180.
Id. 24.
181.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 10, 24.
182.
Id. 32.
183. Id.
184.
Id.
12.
185.
Id.
13. Article 18.4 of the AD Agreement is the provision which requires
members to take all necessary steps to ensure the conformity of its laws and
administrative procedures with the provisions of the Agreement. See AD Agreement,
supra note 154, art. 18.4.
186.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 10, 14.
187. Id.
188.
Id. 25. The European Community made reference to another panel report
in United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Acts of 1974 (United States-Section
301), available at http://www.wto.org/WT/DS152/R (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
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statute were met.18 9 Additionally, Japan believed that if there were to
be a distinction made between mandatory and discretionary
legislation, the burden of proof should be placed on the United States
(using the distinction as a defense) to prove that the 1916 Act was
discretionary. 190
Substantively, the United States challenged the panels' findings
that the 1916 Act actually fell within the scope of Article VI of the
1994 GATT as interpreted by the AD Agreement. 19 1 The United
States argued that members' laws would only fall into the scope of
Article VI if two criteria were satisfied. 192 "First, the law must impose
a particular type of border adjustment measure . . . Second, the
duties [a typical border measure] . . . must specifically target
'dumping' within the meaning of Article VI:1."'1 9 3 By this reasoning,
member countries are not prohibited from using measures other than
those that fit the criteria listed above. The United States argued that
because the 1916 Act was an internal act that created a private right
of action and did not impose a tariff in conflict with the AD
Agreement, it was not a border adjustment and was therefore not
within the scope of Article VI. 194 The United States characterized the
1916 Act in this dispute as an antitrust law, rather than an
antidumping or customs law, so as to persuade the WTO that it did
195
not conflict with any of its international trade obligations.
The EC responded by citing textual evidence that the WTO had
created a "specific discipline" for members to follow when dealing
with dumping. 196 Article VI applied to both laws that impose duties
on importers found to be dumping and those that do not impose
duties but provide a private cause of action or other remedy to punish
and deter dumping. 19 7 Japan believed that the 1916 Act fell within
the scope of Article VI because the application of Article VI was based
on the type of conduct the members' law addressed, not the remedies

189.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 10, 33.
190.
Id.
191.
Id.
15.
192.
Id.
16.
193.
Id.
18.
194.
Id.
20.
195.
See United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate
Body, supra note 10,
20 (stating that third-party participant India's observation is
that the 1916 Act is an antidumping law rather than an antitrust law).
196.
Id.
197.
Id. As interpreted by the European Community, Article 18.1 of the AD
Agreement "made clear that a 'specific action' against dumping may only be taken in
accordance with Article VI [of 1994 GATT], but this did not prevent the application of
safeguard measures or countervailing duties" as long as they were in conformity with
the rest of the 1994 GATT Agreement. Id. 28.
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applied. 198 The 1916 Act targeted dumping, therefore, by Japan's
reasoning, it must conform to the provisions of Article VI and the AD
Agreement. 199 Both the EC and Japan argued that if the Appellate
Body agreed with the U.S. reasoning, any member could circumvent
the WTO anti-dumping procedures (and therefore eviscerate the
purpose of the special discipline to handle dumping) and
a
requirements by creating anti-dumping laws that did not impose
200
instead.
imprisonment
or
fines
of
payment
the
required
but
duty
The United States also urged that the 1916 Act did not "target
dumping" as required in the criteria to bring it within the scope of
Article VI. 20 1 It actually targeted "predatory pricing" of which the key
indicator was predatory intent, not the act of "dumping," thereby
actually creating additional elements that would need to be satisfied
before the imposition of penalties. 20 2 The Japanese contended that a
member's imposition of additional elements such as intent, even if
difficult,
used to make the imposition of anti-dumping measures more
20 3
VI.
Article
of
scope
the
outside
Act
1916
the
place
not
could
Finally, the United States argued that the panels'
interpretations of Article VI:2 of the 1994 GATT and Article 1 and
18.7:1 of the AD Agreement, a member country may take specific
actions against dumping, other than imposing tariffs, so long as the
actions are within the scope of 1994 GATT. 20 4 The EC agreed that
specific actions against dumping could be taken by member countries.
However, the EC provided that:
[W]hen an antidumping law, which falls within the scope of application
of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the [AD Agreement], allows the
provides for imposition of
imposition of sanctions other than duties ....
measures on the basis of criteria which do not fulfill the substantive
requirements of the discipline [established by Article VI] . . . [and is]
pursuant to procedures which do not respect [Article VI's] procedural
requirements, such measures . . . constitute breaches of the
discipline.

205

The EC's contention was that the 1916 Act violated the discipline set
forth by Article VI in all three ways. 20 6 Japan, taking a different
approach, explained their position that antidumping duties, imposed
by a member country against an importer, were the only permissible

198.

Id.

34.

199.

Id.

35.

Id.
200.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
201.
supra note 10, 16.

202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

206.

Id.

20.
37.
17.
31.
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remedy to counteract dumping and that this construction of Article VI
was explicit and unambiguous. 20 7 Both third-party participants, India
VI of
and Mexico, believed that the 1916 Act must conform to Article
208
the 1994 GATT because it specifically deals with dumping.
Alternative arguments were provided by both the EC and Japan
as conditional appeals. 20 9 If the Appellate Body were to find that the
scope of Article VI did not encompass the 1916 Act, the EC and Japan
requested that the Appellate Body find that the 1916 Act violated
Article III:4 and Article XI of the 1994 GATT. 210 The United States
disagreed that the Appellate Body even had the jurisdiction to
consider this alternative argument. 211 The U.S. argument for this
element of the appeal centered around the fact that neither the EC
nor Japan had included these provisions in their initial request for a
dispute settlement panel review, and therefore there were no factual
212
or legal findings made to be reviewed.
The second alternative argument made by the EC and Japan
involved a request that if the Appellate Body should find in favor of
the United States that the 1916 Act was "non-mandatory," then the
EC and Japan asked the Appellate Body to find that the Act violated
Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.2 13 The United States did not
make a substantive rebuttal for this request, but did suggest the
Appellate Body should only conclude that the 1916 Act violates
214
Article XVI:4 to the extent it violated Article VI of the 1994 GATT.
C. The Appellate Body Findingsand Aftermath
The Appellate Body affirmed most of the findings of both of the
European Communities and Japanese panels regarding the U.S.
jurisdictional objections and its objections to the substantive legal
findings sending a clear signal to the United States that it wished it
would bring its antidumping remedies into compliance with its WTO
obligations.2 15 The Appellate Body agreed that the interim review
was not the appropriate time to bring up jurisdictional objections for
the first time because those objections should be raised as early in the

207.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 10, 9 37. Japan cited Article 18.1 and footnote 24 of the AD Agreement as
authority for this proposition. Id.
208.
Id. 9 46-49.
209.
Id. 9 40-41.
210.
Id. T 40.
211.
Id. 944.
212.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 10, 44.
213.
Id.
41.
214.
Id. 9 45.
215.
See id. 19 50-155.
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dispute resolution process as possible to allow for due process
considerations. 2 16 However, because the Appellate Body did not agree
with the EC that objections to jurisdiction are simply "procedural
objections," the U.S. objection to jurisdiction was still considered
2 17
timely.
With regard to the right of the panels to hear the claims against
the 1916 Act, the Appellate Body found that there must be a legal
basis to hear the claim of inconsistency under both the 1994 GATT
and the AD Agreement. 218 Under Articles XXII and XXIII of the 1994
GATT, which serve as the basis for dispute settlements, a member is
allowed to bring a claim against another member when it believes
that the benefits accruing to it under the agreement are being
"nullified or impaired, or [if it believes] that the achievement of any
objective of the 1994 GATT is being impeded, as a result of the failure
of that other [m]ember to carry out its obligations under that
Agreement. '21 9 Prior to the WTO Agreement, the Appellate Body
acknowledged, 1947 GATT recognized the right of a member country
to challenge another member's legislation independent of an
application of that legislation. 220 Therefore, a legal basis was found
under 1994 GATT to bring a claim against members whose
conformity with WTO obligations is questionable. 22 1 Under the AD
Agreement, the Body found that Article 17 creates a legal basis for
disputes. 222 Neither Article 17.1 nor 17.2, the articles that provide for
dispute settlement arising under the AD Agreement, were found to
distinguish between legislative disputes and disputes about the
implementation of legislation. 223 Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement is
a "special or additional dispute settlement rule" regarding the
implementation of definitive antidumping duties by a member,
however the Body held that there was no prior Appellate Body
holding that would suggest that Article 17.4 precluded review of
general claims against a member's legislation. 224 The Appellate Body
found that this reasoning was supported by Article 18.4 because this

216.
Id.
54.
217.
Id.
218.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 10, 56.
219.
Id.
59.
220.
Id.
60. The Appellate Body also noted that since the WTO Agreement was
put in force, dispute settlement bodies had listened to claims which challenged the
conformity of another member's laws without challenging an application of that law.
Id.
221.
Id. 59.
222.
Id. 64.
223.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 10,
63, 65; see AD Agreement, supra note 154, arts. 17.1-17.2.
224.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 10, 72.
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article imposed an affirmative obligation on members to make their
laws consistent with the AD Agreement. 225 If a member could not
bring a claim against another member's legislation alone, this would
226
diminish the effectiveness of this article.
The Appellate Body upheld both panels' findings that the 1916
Act was mandatory legislation and was therefore subject to review by
the WTO dispute settlement bodies. 227 Neither the panels, nor the
Appellate Body could find discretion in the executive branch of
government under the 1916 Act, which is necessary to characterize
the law as discretionary. 228 The Body found that the U.S. government
had no discretion with respect to the civil action authorized by the
1916 Act, because the sole discretion to bring this action was with
domestic producers. 2 29 The Body also held that the discretion of the
U.S. Department of Justice to initiate criminal proceedings does not
make the 1916 Act discretionary in the way it would fall outside the
jurisdiction of the dispute settlement panels.2 30 With regard to the
U.S. challenge to the panels' characterization of the burden of proof in
mandatory/discretionary legislation cases, the Appellate Body agreed
with the panels that after the complaining member produced prima
facie evidence that a member's laws did not comply with WTO
agreements, the burden of proof shifted to that member to prove that
their law was discretionary and could be interpreted to conform with
23l
their WTO obligations.
The Appellate Body also upheld both panels' substantive
findings. The Body found that Article VI:2 of the 1994 GATT gave
members permission to establish antidumping duties.23 2 However,
this permission did not mean that they had the choice to either use
duties or another type of measure to counteract dumping; it meant
that they could simply chose to require duties to be paid, or they
could chose not to require duties.2 33 With regard to the AD
Agreement, the Body held that Article 18.1 governed a "specific action
against dumping" taken by one of the members. 23 4 At a minimum, a

225.
Id. 78.
226.
Id.
227.
Id. 7 84-102.
228.
Id.
89-93. The Body mentioned in a footnote that characterization as
discretionary may not save a member's law from violating its WTO obligations. See id.
at 26 n.59 (citing Panel Report, United States-Section 301, adopted Jan. 27, 2000,
availableat http://www.wto.orglWT/DS152/R).
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
229.
supra note 10, 1 90.
Id. 91.
230.
231.
Id. 97.
232.
Id. 116.
233.
Id. The Appellate Body also found Article VI:2 gave members the choice to
impose duties at the equal to the dumping margin or impose a lower tariff. Id.
234.
Id. 122.
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"specific action against dumping" is taken if the elements of
"dumping" listed in Article VI of the 1994 GATT are satisfied. 23 5 The
1916 Act requires the satisfaction of elements of the Article VI
dumping elements, and, therefore, the Appellate Body held that the
criminal and civil penalties imposed by the Act were "specific action
23 6
against dumping" and, thus, Article VI applies to the 1916 Act.
Article 18.1 prohibits "specific actions against dumping" that are not
in accordance with the provisions of the 1994 GATT, and the Body
found that Article VI was applicable to any action "taken in response
' 23 7
to situations presenting the constituent elements of 'dumping.'
Although the 1916 Act has the additional element of intent, the
Appellate Body still believed that it was a specific action against
dumping, and, because the only remedies allowed by Article VI are
definitive antidumping duties, provisional measures, and price
23 8
undertakings, it was inconsistent with the U.S. WTO obligations.
As the Appellate Body upheld both panels' findings on this regard, it
did not rule on the conditional appeals of the EC and Japan. 23 9 The
Appellate Body recommended that the dispute settlement body
request the United States bring the 1916 Act into compliance with
240
Article VI of the 1994 GATT.
The repercussions of this Appellate Body ruling were felt
immediately in the United States. House of Representatives
Committee on Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas introduced
H.R. 3557 which, as previously mentioned, would have repealed the
1916 Act. 24 1 H.R. 1073 and S. 1155, introduced in the 108th
Congressional Session, will hopefully be voted on by both houses this
year. U.S. delegates to the WTO have made periodic reports to the
DSB regarding the progress of the United States in complying with
its WTO obligations. 242 Specifically, U.S. reports stated that an Act to
repeal the 1916 Act was proposed, it was being reviewed by
committees in both houses of Congress and would be voted on as soon
2 43
as a full review was made.
Judicially, the Goss litigation, which was the only major case
invoking the Antidumping Act of 1916 after the WTO Appellate Body

235.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Report of the Appellate Body,
supra note 10, 122.
236.
Id. 130.
237.
Id. 126.
238.
Id. 132.
239.
Id. 155(g).
240.
Id.
156.
241.
See Repeal Act, H.R. 1073, 108th Cong. (2003).
242.
United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916: Status Report by the United
States, WTJDS/14/Add/12-WTDS162/17Add. 12 (Feb. 6. 2003).
243.
Id.
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decision, was stalled at the district court level.2 44 The district court
stayed a final decision on the matter pending the repeal of the 1916
245
Act, which would make this portion of Goss's complaint moot.
When H.R. 3557 was not passed, Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho moved for
summary judgment. 246 The court denied the motion, holding that
material issues of fact existed as to whether the product comparisons
were close enough to prove the required 1916 anti-dumping
2 47
elements.

IV. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS THE SOLE REMEDY FOR
DUMPING

To comply with its trade obligations and avoid additional
disputes with its trade partners, the United States must comply with
the Appellate Body's decision as well as the Dispute Settlement
Panel's request that 1916 Act be brought into compliance with Article
VI of the 1994 GATT and the AD Agreement. While the repeal of the
1916 Act curbs U.S. power to control foreign dumping through its own
methodology, the procedures and remedies required by the WTO
provide better protection against foreign dumping for U.S.
manufacturers than the judicial uncertainty of the Antidumping Act.
A. Discrepanciesbetween the WTO Dumping Dispute Methodology
and the 1916 Act
Although an overall assessment will finally show the WTO
procedures and remedies to be a better choice, there are several
fundamental differences between the WTO's Article VI of the 1994
GATT and the AD Agreement and the U.S. 1916 Antidumping Act
that make the WTO antidumping provisions potentially less palatable
to U.S. companies. The methods and calculus of determining whether
dumping occurred are dissimilar in the two processes. In particular,
each methodology includes different elements that must be satisfied
by the complaining party.248 The WTO remedies do not involve
reparations to the producer who claims and proves harm because of

See generally Goss Graphics Sys. v. MAN Roland Drucksmaschinen
244.
Aktiengesellschaft, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Iowa 2001). See also discussion supra
text accompanying note 17.
Id.
245.
Goss Int'l Corp. v. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1027,
246.
1030 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
Id. at 1039.
247.
See AD Agreement, supra note 154, art. 3; 1916 Antidumping Act, 15
248.
U.S.C. § 72 (2002).
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dumping, nor does it authorize payment to the industry in which the
dumping occurred. No specific penalties are authorized, and there is
no authorization for punitive damages of any kind. In addition,
because of the WTO classification of countries at varying stages of
economic development, countries with a lower development
classification may be protected from having any dumping duties
levied on their manufacturers and exporters. Furthermore,
international settlements under the WTO are not binding and may be
reviewed and repealed.
The WTO method requires that a country apply to be permitted
to initiate its own antidumping investigation and to prove that the
majority of the domestic participants in the industry believe dumping
is occurring. Article 5 of the AD Agreement requires that "an
investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any
alleged dumping [be] initiated upon a written application by or on
behalf of the domestic industry." 249 The application must include
specific evidence of dumping, proof of injury at defined in Article VI of
the 1994 GATT, and a causal link between the dumped imports and
the injury alleged. 250 An investigation by the complaining country is
not allowed if the WTO authorities determine that there is not
enough support for the application. 25 1 "Enough support" to initiate
the investigation requires domestic producers of the complaining
country who produce at least "fifty percent of the total production of
the like product" to express their support for the application. 25 2 This
time-consuming and complicated application process is not required
when a company brings suit under the 1916 Act, and the addition of
253
this step will clearly add time to an already lengthened process.
Additionally, the application process will increase dumping harm to
domestic industry as it creates a hurdle that may be insurmountable
by industries populated by both large and small producers or
industries that are fragmented by geography as the complaining
producer may not be able to garner enough support from fellow
producers to reach the level required by the WTO authorities to allow
an investigation to be opened.

Keppler, supra note 148, at 304 (quoting AD Agreement, supra note 154,
249.
art. 5.1).
AD Agreement, supranote 154, art. 5.2.
250.
251.
Id. art. 5.4.
252.
Id.
The only similar procedure to the WTO application requirement in U.S. law
253.
is the ability of the defendant to file a motion to dismiss. The two procedures are
similar because only the complaining party's evidence is used to make the decision
whether to allow the case or investigation to go forward, however the U.S. system has
statutory procedures and judicial precedent for judges to rely on when they are ruling
on a motion to dismiss.
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The heightened pleading and burden of proof requirements of the
WTO antidumping procedures will also be prohibitive for U.S.
companies. While the 1916 Act requires the complaining party prove
that the alleged dumper intended to injure a domestic U.S. industry,
prevent its establishment, or restrain or monopolize trade in the
United States, under the AD Agreement the complaining country will
have to prove that there was a material injury or threat of material
injury to a U.S. industry and that there was a causal link between
the dumping and the injury. 254 To further complicate matters, the AD
255
Agreement does not define what constitutes a "material" injury.
The only guidance given by the WTO is that the authorities will
review "(i) the volume of dumped imports and the effect of the
dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products,
and (ii) the consequent impact of the dumped imports on domestic
producers of the like product. 2 56 No weight is given to either of these
factors,2 57 leaving the interpretation of their meaning up to members.
Similarly, the only guidance given to members trying to prove that
there was a threat to material injury is that the evaluation (which
includes a review of the rate of increase of dumped imports, the
capacity of the exporter, the likely effect of prices of dumped imports,
and inventories) will be based solely on facts, and will not include
258
mere allegations.
The remedies provided by Article VI of the 1994 GATT and the
AD Agreement do not provide the ability for harmed domestic
producers individually or collectively as an industry to recoup the
losses they suffered from dumping. The only remedies provided by the
AD Agreement are provisional measures, price undertakings, and
actual antidumping duties. 259 There is no mention of punitive
damages for those exporters found dumping on members' soil, and
any antidumping duty must be for the full margin or less, not more
than the actual harm done. 260 This is in stark contrast to the 1916
Act imposition of treble damages. 26 1 The WTO is clearly not passing
judgment on whether dumping is fair or unfair competition, as they
are neither rewarding nor truly penalizing parties in either of the
member countries. However, by not imposing punitive damages on
offenders, the WTO antidumping provisions are not truly deterrence

254.
See 1916 Antidumping Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (2002); AD Agreement, supra
note 154, art. 3.
255.
ADP: Injury, available at http://www.wto.org/Englishlthewto-e/whatis-e/
eolle/wto04/wto4_14.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
256.
Id.
257.
Id.
258.
Id.
259.
AD Agreement, supra note 154, arts. 7-9.
260.
Id. art. 9.1.
261.
See discussion supra text accompanying note 34.
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mechanisms either. In fact, the AD Agreement's heightened initial
requirements to allow the commencement of an investigation and the
abbreviated remedies act as a deterrent to member countries in
bringing antidumping complaints.
Two final characteristics of the WTO antidumping provisions are
dubious. If manufacturers in a developing country are found to have
committed dumping violations against an industry in a developed
country, the AD Agreement provides that special accommodations
should be made by that developed country when considering the
application of antidumping duties. 262 The AD Agreement requests
that developed countries consider "constructive remedies" before
applying antidumping duties on manufacturers in developing
countries found to have dumped their goods in violation of the
Agreement. 263 This provision creates the unpalatable notion that
manufacturers in underdeveloped or developing countries dumping
goods and hurting the industry of industrialized, developed nations is
more understandable and acceptable than manufacturers in other
developed nations doing the same. The result is the equation of a
manufacturer's abilities to compete in international trade to the
abilities of the country where it is domiciled, an unequivocal
comparison at best. This concept is also in opposition to the typical
U.S. procedure of imparting the same punishment on all corporate
offenders, not just those who can survive the punishment. In
addition, the penalties imposed by the members are reviewed by
WTO authorities, can be terminated at any time, and shall be
terminated at the latest five years after the duty has been imposed
unless the complaining member proves their necessity again. 264 Any
review forces the complaining party to produce all of the information
required in the initial complaint. 2 65 This increases the expense and
uncertainty for producers and member countries who are victims of
dumping and further deters complaints from being brought to the
WTO.
B. InternationalDispute Settlement ProceduresProvide the Best
Remedy againstInternationalDumping
Despite the negative aspects of Article VI and the AD
Agreement, the positive features of the WTO dispute settlement
procedures make it a more effective choice to deter dumping in the

262.

Procedural Requirements of the Agreement on Implementation of Article

VI of the 1994 GATT, available at http:/www.wto.orglEnglish/tratop-eladp-e/
antidum2_e.htm (discussing AD Agreement, supra note 154, art. 15).
263.
AD Agreement, supra note 154, art. 15.
264.
Id. art. 11.
265.
Id.
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United States. Because of its government-centered reparation system,
it protects competition and promotes international trade instead of
protecting domestic competitors, as they do not receive a direct
payment for dumping violations under the WTO system. In addition,
the WTO methodology has actually led to punishment of dumping
offenders, as opposed to the 1916 Act, which in nearly one hundred
years has not produced a single conviction. 266 The elements a
complaining member needs to prove do not include the nebulous
"intent" element included in the 1916 Act. Most importantly,
antidumping
separates
resolution
dispute
international
investigations and remedies from U.S. antitrust legislation and
jurisprudence, a distinction that has troubled U.S. courts for decades,
and a result that will legitimize the U.S. actions against trade
partners who dump goods into domestic industry.
The Antidumping Act of 1916, because it provides treble
damages to the complaining party, provides an advantage to U.S.
manufacturers because they reap the benefits of the punitive portion
of the damages awarded if they can prove the elements of dumping.
The fact that the Act only affects international trade partners and is
administered to provide payment to the injured domestic party makes
the law appear protectionist in nature. By providing for duties to be
imposed as a remedy against dumping, the AD Agreement and Article
VI of the 1994 GATT place international trading partners on an
essentially equal level. The WTO method promotes competition
instead of assisting competitors because it does not "reward" a
particular manufacturer for its inability to compete on an
international level with three times the injury sustained.
Economically, this is a more desirable system because it does not
promote the maintenance of firms whose business model is below that
which is beneficial to stay in business.
Unlike the 1916 Act, the WTO antidumping provisions have been
successfully implemented to counteract dumping in its member
countries. Because of the complainants' inability to prove the intent
requirement or the "like product" requirement in the 1916 Act, no
U.S. company has been successful in convicting and receiving
damages from a foreign business for its dumping practices using this
statute. 267 Very few cases have been brought under the 1916 Act
throughout the twentieth century. Furthermore, Congress recognized
the necessity of duties to control foreign importers dumping goods
into U.S. markets by enacting the Antidumping Act of 1921 and
subsequent Trade Agreement Acts. 268 In contrast, members of the

266.
267.
268.

See Rethinking the 1916 Antidumping Act, supra note 6.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 68-87.
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WTO have requested over one hundred antidumping investigations in
recent history pursuant to Article VI of the 1994 GATT, many of
which were requested by the United States. 269 While the number of
investigations handled by the WTO is substantial, the incidental
effect of this environment may be more beneficial to the United
States. In addition to providing a global forum to resolve antidumping
disputes, the WTO provides international awareness to member
countries of those members whose domestic manufacturers are
involved in many disputes, as well as a list of countries who strictly
invoke their rights to request antidumping investigations.
The WTO elements, while stringent, provide several advantages
for U.S. producers. First, the 1916 Act element of intent is not
270
required under Article VI of the 1994 GATT or the AD Agreement.
As this element has caused particular discourse among U.S. judges
and members of the bar, its absence should be a relief for U.S.
producers. Also, the fact that the U.S. government must request an
investigation from the WTO dispute settlement body and provide
proof of dumping eases the financial and time requirements that
individual manufacturers may have struggled with under the 1916
Act. Resources and information can be compiled and shared in
relative confidence between domestic competitors without the
incurrence of additional fees. Moreover, the burden or proving the
"like product" and appropriate price elements, which are the similar
in both methodologies, can be more easily accomplished by the
government collecting and assessing economic data, than by a single
firm.
Finally, using the WTO antidumping remedies provides an
opportunity to separate antidumping and antitrust disputes and
remedies. Throughout the history of the 1916 Act, jurists have
struggled with Congress' intent in passing it. 271 Because of the nature
of the damages imposed and some legislative and judicial comments
that it is an extension of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, there is
272
some support for its interpretation as an antitrust statute.
However, as it deals exclusively with international trade, its purpose
as a trade and tariff provision must also be considered. These two
characterizations are at odds with one another because the purpose of
antitrust legislation is vigorously to promote and defend competition,
however trade regulations may sacrifice some elements of competition
to promote international relations and good will. By repealing the

269.
adp-e.htm
270.
271.
272.
1190 (E.D.

See Anti-dumping, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/adp-e/
(last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
See 1916 Antidumping Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (2002).
See supra text accompanying note 92.
See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. , 494 F. Supp.
Pa. 1960).
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1916 Act and using WTO international dispute resolution as the
exclusive remedy for foreign dumping, confusion over the legislative
purpose, and subsequently its judicial interpretation is removed,
leading to the treatment of U.S. industry uniformly across
jurisdictions. For these reasons, U.S. manufacturers should welcome
the repeal of the 1916 Antidumping Act.

V. CONCLUSION

Throughout its history, the 1916 Antidumping Act has lain
almost entirely dormant, with only a few cases interpreting its
complex elements. There is scant legislative history and no
subsequent amendments or additions to the Act to shed light on the
Congressional purpose behind it and distinguish it as either an
antitrust or trade statute. Recently, U.S. trade partners have
challenged its validity, and it has been deemed to violate the
international trade obligations made by the United States under 1994
GATT. Based on this series of events, House of Representatives Bill
H.R. 3557 has been introduced to repeal the 1916 Antidumping Act.
To the detriment of U.S. producers, repeal of the 1916 Antidumping
Act will eliminate private party reparations and do away with treble
damage awards. However, as there has been minimal adjudication
under this law and no convictions or damages paid as a result of its
violation, a more effective remedy is necessary. Article VI of the 1994
GATT and the AD Agreement provide a solution that U.S.
manufacturers should find acceptable and will be agreeable to our
international trade partners.
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